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From Integration to Differentiation: The 
Czech Republic in the European Union 
Ten Years On
by Vít Dostál
Summary
The Czech Republic’s first ten years in the EU have been marked by several ups and 
downs. Though the Czech Republic increased its trade exchange and played important 
roles in several fields (such as the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood Policy, the internal mar-
ket, EU enlargement, and energy), it also acquired a negative label thanks to its surpri-
sing positions. The Czechs are among the most skeptical nations in the EU regarding 
the future of  the European integration project – despite the massive inflow of  foreign 
direct investments, the rise of  its GDP in the first years after the accession, and the 
Czech Republic’s central geographic position in Europe. Moreover, the Czech economy 
is very tightly bound to the euro area, since its most important trading partners – Ger-
many and Slovakia – use the single currency. The analysis tackles main trends in the 
Czech Republic’s EU membership and examines the country’s potential role in the EU. 
It concludes that, although the priorities of  Czech EU policy are stable, the country’s 
political representation lacks interest in EU affairs.
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From Integration to Differentiation: The Czech 
Republic in the European Union Ten Years On
by Vít Dostál
The Czech Republic’s first ten years in the EU have 
been marked by several ups and downs. Though 
the country increased its trade exchange and played 
important roles in several fields (such as the EU’s 
Eastern Neighborhood Policy [ENP], the inter-
nal market, EU enlargement, and energy), it also 
acquired a negative label thanks to its surprising 
positions and behavior. One example of  this was 
the fall of  the Czech government in the middle of  
the country’s EU Council presidency (which took 
place in the first half  of  2009), a collapse provoked 
by the Social Democrats. Another was the intro-
duction of  demands that slowed the country’s rati-
fication of  the Lisbon Treaty, demands that were 
articulated by President Václav Klaus.
Apart from these episodes, there have been even 
more significant paradoxes. The Czechs are among 
the EU’s most skeptical nations regarding the 
future of  the European integration project – des-
pite the massive inflow of  foreign direct invest-
ments (FDIs), the rise of  Czech GDP in the first 
years after accession, and the Czech Republic’s cen-
tral geographic position in Europe. Moreover, the 
Czech economy is tightly bound to the euro area, 
as its most important trade partners (Germany 
and Slovakia) use the single currency. Nevertheless, 
the Czech governments have lacked the deter-
mination to join in. Last but not least, the Czech 
Republic was supposed to receive the highest per 
capita share from the EU budget in the 2007–13 
programming period. The management of  the 
EU funds was ineffective, however, and the Czech 
Republic has not been able to absorb them.
Naturally, several questions arise: How did the 
Czech Republic’s membership develop? What kind 
of  trends can be observed? And what are the pro-
spects? The following sections address these issues. 
The text is structured into two main sections. The 
first part of  the paper will provide a retrospective 
overview of  the Czech Republic’s EU membership. 
It will focus on major trends in relations with the 
EU as well as on the debate on the EU within the 
country. The intention is not to cover all events 
but to single out major features of  the country’s 
first decade in the EU – in other words, the turning 
points. Two issues will therefore be discussed in 
more detail: the country’s EU Council presidency 
in the first half  of  2009 and its ratification of  the 
Lisbon Treaty, which did not take place until late 
2009. The last section will be devoted to the impact 
of  the current economic crisis on Czech member-
ship in the EU.
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Retrospective Overview
1.1 Czech European Policy from the Eve of 
EU Membership to the Lisbon Treaty
Over 77 percent of  Czech voters supported the 
country’s accession to the European Union in the 
referendum held in June 2003 – the first and only 
national referendum in Czech history.1 The over-
whelming majority of  the electorate was thus in 
favor of  Czech membership of  the EU and wanted 
to pursue the election slogan of  the Civic Forum 
party from the 1990 elections: “Back to Europe.” 
This slogan was of  no small significance, since it 
involved a radical sea change in the development 
of  Czechoslovakia: full membership in all Euro-
Atlantic political and economic organizations.
The ultimate goal of  Czech foreign policy as it 
was pursued throughout the 1990s was achieved 
when negotiations were concluded in Copenhagen 
in December 2002. The Accession Treaty was sig-
ned in Athens in April 2003 by the newly elected 
president, Václav Klaus, and the prime minister, 
Stanislav Gross. After the referendum described 
above, the Czech Republic entered the EU on May 
1, 2004. Even then, however, the Czech Republic’s 
priorities in the EU were ambiguous.
The foreign policy concept issued in 2003 by the 
country’s center-right government is surprisingly 
vague on the subject of  European affairs.2 It high-
lights EU membership as a value per se but lacks 
any commitment regarding its priorities in the 
EU. It states that the principal goal is to be “fully 
involved” in the European integration project. It 
does not, however, provide any strong position 
relating to the debate on the future of  the EU – a 
debate that was at its peak in 2003, as the Euro-
pean constitution was just about to be drafted by 
the European Convention.3 This was in line with 
the political orientation of  the coalition partners 
in the Czech government. The Social Democrats, 
Christian Democrats, and liberal Freedom Union 
were all pro-federal and pro-integration politi-
cal – parties that perceived EU membership as a 
final step in the process of  the Czech Republic’s 
political, economic, and societal transformation. 
Furthermore, the foreign policy concept document 
also emphasized full involvement in the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) as one of  its priorities. 
The government adopted the first Czech Republic’s 
Euro-Area Accession Strategy in autumn 2003, set-
ting a possible target date of  2009 or 2010.4
There were not that many issues resonating in 
Czech society relating to EU accession. The main 
concerns were unprecedented inflation and other 
fears that related to the tough years of  economic 
transformation of  the 1990s. Nevertheless, one 
topic was much discussed. As the accession treaty’s 
ratification process proceeded in the EU-15 coun-
tries, societies in western European countries raised 
concerns regarding a possible massive westward 
flow of  immigrants from new member states. Tran-
sition periods were therefore introduced in most of  
the EU-15 countries. From the Czech perspective, 
this was seen as unfair treatment, mainly because 
these provisions were implemented in neighboring 
countries like Austria and Germany.
The Czech Republic participated in its first Euro-
pean Parliament elections on June 10 and 11, 2004. 
The majority of  seats were won by Euroskep-
tics (17 out of  24). Nine seats were won by soft 
Euroskeptics from the Civic Democratic Party 
(Občanská demokratická strana – ODS), six seats 
went to unreformed communists and two hardline 
Euroskeptics from the populist Independent party. 
Pro-integration parties shared just seven seats. The 
anti-European campaign was led by the commu-
nists, though they were able to rely on a disciplined 
and stable electorate, and the Independents.
The results of  the 2004 European Parliament elec-
tions were typical of  second-order elections, with 
some exceptions. The parties that ranked first and 
second (ODS and the Communist party) and gai-
ned the majority of  seats were also the main oppo-
sition parties in the Chamber of  Deputies. The 
governing parties only gained four of  the 24 seats. 
The election campaign of  the parliamentary oppo-
sition (and simultaneously Euroskeptic parties) 
mainly focused on socio-economic issues, and elec-
tions were heralded as a “referendum on the fate 
of  the government.” This election also displayed 
other characteristics of  second-order elections: low 
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electoral turnout, rise of  non-parliamentary parties, 
and relatively low level of  media attention. On the 
other hand, one non-parliamentary party, the Euro-
pean Democrats, systematically created an image of  
pro-integration and internationally competent grou-
ping. Their campaign was led by a former foreign 
minister, Josef  Zieleniec, and focused mainly on 
faux pas that government officials had committed 
at the European level.
The Czech Republic’s first European Parliament elec-
tions were a success for the Euroskeptic parties but 
not a triumph of  Euroskepticism as such. It never-
theless provided the Euroskeptics with an important 
forum, with credibility, and it indicated that they might 
be the winners of  the next general elections and thus 
determine the future of  Czech European policy.
The Czech center-right government was generally 
supportive of  the proposal for a Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe (TCE). Unlike Poland, the 
Czech Republic did not raise any specific demands. 
The prime minister and minister of  foreign affairs 
signed the treaty, and the government discussed the 
process of  ratification. It was ultimately decided to 
ratify the treaty by parliament. The treaty would there-
fore have been approved by both the upper and lower 
chambers of  the Czech legislature. In the autumn 
2004 senate elections, the ODS defended its position 
of  opposing any transfer of  national sovereignty to 
supranational bodies. Since ODS held one third of  
seats, and since there were also other parties that 
opposed the treaty (mainly a handful of  communists), 
it would have been very risky for the pro-constitutio-
nal cabinet to start the legislative procedure.
Václav Klaus, the founder of  the ODS who had 
surprisingly lost the general election in 2002 and 
consequently resigned the leadership of  the party, 
became the president of  the Czech Republic in 
2003. It should be noted that although the country 
is a parliamentary republic, the president was very 
influential from 1918 to 1948 and has again exerted 
great influence since 1989. Presidential authority 
was also exploited in such areas as international 
affairs. Klaus cherry-picked European affairs as 
one of  his pet issues.
Klaus, who was inspired by British Conservatives 
and revered Margaret Thatcher, criticized European 
integration after the Maastricht Treaty. He could 
therefore not neglect the TCE, and he led the for-
mation of  its Czech critics. His criticism was nei-
ther very specific nor valid. He spoke of  “misinter-
pretation” and “vagueness.” His catchwords were 
“federalism,” “unification” and “loss of  sovereignty.” 
Nevertheless, nobody took up his challenge and 
came out publicly as a recognized proponent of  
EU treaty reform. Nobody else spoke the language 
the broad public understands. He was indeed a 
skillful politician with a certain academic façade 
that helped him to gradually establish himself  as an 
agenda setter for Czech European policy.
The new center-right government was formed 
in 2007 following the general election in 2006. It 
included ODS, Greens, and Christian Democrats. 
As mentioned above, ODS continued to represent 
the Euroskeptics, whereas Greens and Christian 
Democrats supported further integration, in kee-
ping with their traditional positions. Furthermore, 
the cabinet had only very weak support in the 
Chamber of  Deputies. Parliamentary consent for 
the newly formed government was given only 
thanks to the fact that MPs elected from the Social 
Democratic ballot finally supported it.
As soon as it was formed, the new government 
started preparing for the 2009 EU Council presi-
dency. It created the post of  the vice-prime minis-
ter for European affairs and assigned it to Alexandr 
Vonda. The first list of  priorities was published in 
autumn 2007.5 It included six main areas.
The first priority was called “Competitive and 
Open Europe.” It mirrored the general focus of  
the Czech Republic on the deepening of  the single 
market and fulfilling the so-called four freedoms. It 
desired to stress a new EU economic strategy that 
would substitute the Lisbon Strategy. It emphasized 
the free movement of  persons, industrial policy, 
free competition, innovations, small and medium 
enterprises, and a liberal approach to EU external 
trade relations. Since the “Competitive and Open 
Europe” agenda was perceived as the main priority, 
this chapter stemmed from strong national prefe-
rences. The liberal single market has been a natural 
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priority for the export-oriented Czech economy. 
Moreover, the single market represented the part 
of  the EU also acknowledged by tougher Euros-
keptics from the ODS.
The second priority was “Sustainable and Secure 
Energy.” The Czech Republic wanted to focus on 
the security of  energy supplies and the deepening 
of  the gas and electricity market. This was gover-
ned mainly by geopolitics. The Czech Republic 
has long been dependent on the import of  natural 
resources from Russia, so Czech politicians, mainly 
those from center-right parties, insisted on looking 
for alternative suppliers and were encouraged in 
their efforts by the first gas crisis in 2006. Secondly, 
the EU lacked sufficient cross-border energy infra-
structure connections among member states. Huge 
investments in this area were seen as a prerequisite 
for a functioning gas and electricity market.
The third priority was the EU budget: the discus-
sion of  “A Budget for Europe’s Future.” Its main 
goal was to reform the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). It was clear from the document’s lan-
guage that the Czech Republic did not see the CAP 
as a positive instrument. It emphasized the need 
for a gradual reduction of  its share of  the total 
EU budget. Interestingly, it did not focus on the 
uneven distribution of  subsidies between old and 
new member states but instead torpedoed the rati-
onale of  CAP’s very existence. This was probably 
also linked to the ODS party’s priorities. Like the 
British Tories, ODS viewed CAP as an unnecessary 
redistribution policy that twisted natural market 
logic. Surprisingly, not that much was said about 
the EU’s post-2013 Cohesion Policy, even though 
the Czech Republic received the highest per capita 
allocation in the 2007–2013 Financial Perspective.
The fourth priority was to focus on “Europe as 
a Global Player.” It underlined three main areas 
where the Czech Republic thought the EU should 
be more active. First among these was transatlan-
tic cooperation. This was promoted by the pro-
transatlantic approach of  the Czech Republic and 
government at the time. (Furthermore, the possible 
installation of  elements of  the US Missile Defense 
System were discussed in the Czech Republic bet-
ween 2006 and 2009.) A second area related to the 
Western Balkans and the Czech Republic’s strong 
support of  further EU enlargement in the region. 
Another area was Eastern Europe and Czech sup-
port for intensifying the eastern dimension of  the 
European Neighborhood Policy.
“Secure and Free Europe” was the list’s final priority. 
This did not mention any specific Czech priority. It 
was probably included to cover all three pillars of  
the then EU institutional architecture and because 
the launch of  the new post-Hague multi-annual 
program for justice and home affairs was expected 
in 2009.
Overall, the very first policy paper of  the Czech 
EU Council presidency included many inherently 
Czech priorities. It was neither bounded by con-
secutive tripartite negotiations with France and 
Sweden that were concluded by completing the 
18-month program, nor was it particularly detailed. 
It was instead preoccupied with individual dossiers 
like the presidency program from the beginning of  
January 2009.
If  we look how these priorities were realized during 
the presidency itself  (January–June 2009), we have 
to admit that the list was very much in line with the 
first program. As always with Council presidencies, 
however, the country at the helm can hardly focus 
exclusively on its own goals, nor can it always fulfill 
them. A substantial part of  the presidential agenda 
is inherited, and external factors influence the 
to-do list. The Czech case was no exception. Quite 
the opposite. The global financial crisis started in 
the United States in autumn 2008. As it spread to 
Europe, the economic environment became very 
unstable. It is therefore not surprising that the 
Czech presidency’s main task was to react to the 
crisis. As a result, the Czech Republic was una-
ble to push much of  its “Competitive and Open 
Europe” agenda, and it mainly centered its atten-
tion on maintaining the single market and a fair 
competitive environment.
On the other hand, the gas crisis that broke out in 
January 2009 drew much attention to the problem 
of  the security of  energy supplies, and the Czech 
presidency did succeed in broadening this debate. 
The Eastern Partnership was launched in May, and 
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newly elected US president Barack Obama arrived 
for the EU-US summit. However, the partnership 
lacked any strong conclusions, and almost no pro-
gress was achieved in the area of  EU enlargement. 
Although the “CAP Health Check” was carried out, 
it did not have much significance for the post-2013 
EU budget.
Centrally, the Czech EU Council presidency was a 
huge success for the Czech public administration. 
Since the presidency took place at the end of  the 
European Commission’s mandate, the legislative 
processes of  many legislative acts were due to be 
finished off. This was achieved in all but two cases.
We must recall, however, that the Czech government 
that arose from the 2006 general election had very 
fragile support in the Chamber of  Deputies. During 
the Council presidency, sharp polarization within 
Czech politics precluded any accord on tolerance of  
the cabinet. Social Democrats invoked a vote of  non-
confidence, and the government fell at the end of  
March 2009. Although the vote was initiated by Social 
Democrats, it was caused mainly by the fragility of  the 
coalition parties. Several MPs elected on the lists of  
coalition parties left the government camp and voted 
no. Nevertheless, it was rather unusual, to say the least, 
that the pro-integration Social Democrats broke the 
government in the middle of  the Czech Republic’s 
Council presidency mandate. They had given the 
power into the hands of  Klaus, who was now char-
ged with appointing a new prime minister. It is worth 
noting that he should have considered the proposals 
of  the political parties but failed to do so. This meant 
that he could have chosen his own nominee with a 
tough Euroskeptic attitude. He did not do so, but 
European affairs were nonetheless taken hostage by 
Czech national politics.
The European Parliament elections of  2009 were 
once again typical second-order elections. They 
concentrated mainly on domestic affairs, since an 
early general election was expected in autumn 2009. 
The ODS won the elections. Nevertheless, this 
should once again not be understood as a triumph 
of  Euroskepticism. Several hardline Euroskeptic 
parties stood in these elections, and some of  them 
were even supported by Klaus. Nevertheless, they 
did not win a single seat.
To conclude, the Czech EU Council presidency of  
January–June 2009 marked probably the most spec-
tacular period of  the Czech EU membership. It 
had both positive and negative effects and revealed 
how seriously Czech politicians take the EU. Two 
positive effects can be identified: firstly that the 
Czech Republic identified its priorities in the EU 
during preparation for the presidency; and secondly 
that a skilled and well-prepared civil administration 
was created to address EU affairs. On the other 
hand, high-level Czech politicians showed that the 
European agenda remained of  secondary impor-
tance for them. They were neither able to agree on 
a temporary ceasefire nor to put the interests or 
the esteem of  the country first.
This brings us to the Lisbon Treaty. Germany’s EU 
Council presidency in the first half  of  2007 had 
re-launched the discussion of  EU reform. After 
some quarreling, the Czech center-right govern-
ment, which included euro-realists from ODS as 
well as federalist Greens and Christian Democrats, 
approved a mandate for upcoming negotiations.6 
It said that the lack of  a new treaty did not mean 
paralysis of  the EU. It centered on the voting in 
the EU Council (mainly on the position of  small 
and medium-sized states) and the role of  national 
parliaments. Furthermore, the Czech Republic 
wanted to remove all quasi-state symbols from the 
treaty text and disagreed with the idea of  including 
the Charter of  Fundamental Rights. It argued that 
the EU should become a party to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Czech Repu-
blic also suggested so-called “two-way-flexibility,” 
which would allow the return of  certain competen-
ces to the national level.
The Czech delegation finally succeeded in most 
cases. The “two-way-flexibility clause” was included 
as a non-binding statement. Its mere existence was 
sold in Prague as a victory, though any practical 
application is hardly conceivable. The solution 
accommodated Social Democrats, Christian Demo-
crats, Greens, and most of  the ODS. On the other 
hand, Klaus and a number of  ODS backbenchers 
from the Senate did not want to accept it. Their 
rhetoric focused on the shift of  sovereignty and 
the virtual abolition of  Czech statehood. Apart 
from that, they also pointed out historical issues. 
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According to them, the Lisbon Treaty re-wrote the 
postwar political order in Europe and strengthened 
Germany. They stated, moreover, that the Charter 
of  Fundamental Rights would give postwar Ger-
man expellees the right to ask for their property 
back.
In spring 2008, a group of  senators sent parts of  the 
Lisbon Treaty to the Czech Constitutional Court. The 
debate on the treaty became hotter after the first Irish 
ratification referendum failed. Klaus and his suppor-
ters claimed that the treaty’s ratification process was 
dead. The president also stated that he would be the 
last in Europe to ratify the Lisbon Treaty. Neverthel-
ess, the Constitutional Court ruled in November 2008 
that the treaty did not collide with the Czech consti-
tutional order. However, the ratification process only 
resumed in spring 2009. First, the Chamber of  Depu-
ties expressed its approval of  the treaty in February, 
followed by the Senate in May. Parliament pushed 
through a provision dealing with cases of  any further 
shift of  competences to the European level.
A group of  senators sent the treaty back to the Czech 
Constitutional Court again in autumn 2009, just 
before the second (and this time successful) Irish 
referendum. Simultaneously, Klaus requested an 
opt-out from the Charter of  Fundamental Rights, as 
he argued once again that the charter would enable 
expelled Germans to claim their former property. Alt-
hough Klaus’s step was constitutionally questionable 
and hyperbolic from a legal point of  view, no political 
parties objected. The European Council agreed that 
the Czech opt-out would be part of  the primary law 
revision linked to the next accession treaty. While the 
Constitutional Court dismissed the senators’ claim, 
Klaus signed the Lisbon Treaty in November 2009. 
The Czech Republic was the last country in the EU to 
ratify it.
The main lesson drawn from the drawn-out Czech 
Lisbon Treaty ratification process was that Václav 
Klaus definitely dominated the Czech discourse on 
the EU. Furthermore, the country’s major politi-
cal parties were not interested in conflict with him, 
though his actions bordered on the unconstitutional. 
This also mirrored the lack of  political will for further 
EU constitutionalization and for further shifts of  
competence from the national to the European level.
1.2 Economic Crises and the de-Europeani-
zation of Czech Politics
The outbreak of  the financial, economic, and debt 
crises influenced not only the Czech economy but 
also, and especially, Czech European policy. The 
debate centered on the consequences of  possible 
euro adoption, the security of  the Czech banking 
system, and problems stemming from high depen-
dency on the European market.
The center-left government that brought the Czech 
Republic into the EU had envisaged adopting the 
euro in 2009 or 2010. However, when the center-
right government was established in 2006, it decla-
red that it should first stabilize the national budget 
and then discuss adopting the euro. The next stra-
tegy of  euro area accession did not therefore state 
any specific date. The government promised to set 
a new date by the end of  2009. However, the cabi-
net collapsed, and the technocratic government did 
not take any decision on the issue.
The Czech Republic did not suffer from the finan-
cial crisis, as its financial sector was stable and well 
regulated after the crisis of  the late 1990s. On the 
other hand, the export-oriented Czech economy 
suffered from the global economic slowdown. The 
GDP shrank by 4.7 percent in 2009. Some officials 
and experts began to point out that the Czech 
Republic was overly dependent on the EU market. 
An export strategy was adopted in 2012 with the 
goal of  raising the share of  non-EU market in 
Czech exports to 30 percent by 2020. On the other 
hand, the outspoken priority of  the government 
was to deepen the single market, which would 
rather boost exports to other EU member states.
The debt crisis in the eurozone broke out in 2010. 
It backed up the argument of  euro-sceptics – espe-
cially Václav Klaus, who always argued that the 
single currency was an artificial political project and 
that neither the EU nor the eurozone was the opti-
mum currency area. The center-right government 
established in 2010 declared in its program that it 
would not introduce any set date for adopting the 
euro. Its logic was that the eurozone had to solve 
first its problems and that the Czech Republic had 
to stabilize its finances. Nevertheless, this approach 
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was basically just passing the buck. Nobody from 
the government ever said precisely what the stabili-
zation of  the eurozone and public finances meant.
As the crises pushed the eurozone to search for new 
solutions, the Czech Republic did not opt in. It has 
not participated in the Euro Plus Pact. Moreover, it 
also refused to sign the Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), although it agreed with its content in 
other secondary legislation acts. This stance was moti-
vated mainly by domestic pressure and reluctance of  
the ODS, which was again the majority party in the 
government, to take part in further integration. The 
fear of  a multi-speed Europe was neglected. ODS 
officials often repeated that there were already several 
speeds in Europe – since not all member states parti-
cipated in Schengen, Justice and Home Affairs coope-
ration, defense issues, and so forth. The rejection of  
the Fiscal Compact launched a new domestic dispute 
about future euro adoption in the Czech Republic. 
Some ODS members, and especially President Klaus, 
even demanded an opt-out from euro adoption. The 
ODS generally argued that conditions in the eurozone 
had changed since 2003, when the referendum on 
EU accession took place. They made out that there 
should be a new referendum on the issue. This was 
unacceptable for the pro-integration parties, who 
nevertheless accepted the wait-and-see approach 
toward euro adoption.
The same attitude was also applied to the estab-
lishment of  a European banking union. The Czech 
Republic prided itself  on its healthy banking sector, 
mainly crediting the Czech National Bank, which 
was responsible for the regulation. The country 
did not want to shift the control of  systemic banks 
to the European Central Bank. The government 
therefore refused to participate in the Single Super-
visory Mechanism and focused on instituting speci-
fic regulations that would prevent bypassing of  the 
Czech National Bank’s control.
The Czech Republic has been very reluctant to 
share any risks with the eurozone since 2010. Klaus 
even blocked the amendment of  Article 136 of  the 
Treaty on Functioning of  the EU, which was sup-
posed to ease the launch of  the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM). Moreover, he misinterpreted it 
totally. He said that he was blocking the ESM it self, 
even though as a non-eurozone member state, the 
Czech Republic was not party to it, and it was 
already in operation when he went public with his 
criticism. Unfortunately, the Czech media accepted 
his interpretation.
The Czech economy has not been able to return to 
the unprecedented economic growth (of  more than 
4 percent per annum) that it experienced before the 
outbreak of  the crises. Furthermore, the Czech eco-
nomy has remained dependent on exports to the EU, 
mainly to Germany, the Czech Republic’s biggest tra-
ding partner. Nevertheless, the Czech perspective has 
changed slightly. The single market has been perceived 
as a pivotal benefit of  European integration. Yet it 
was acknowledged that Czech exports have to assert 
themselves in new extra-European markets.
Moreover, the Czech Republic is suspicious of  further 
integration with Europe. The country opted out of  
the banking union and the Fiscal Pact and did not 
participate on the Euro Plus Pact. It also questioned 
its future adoption of  the single currency. The EU 
and especially Western Europe are no longer under-
stood as a source of  universal welfare but also as a 
source of  economic problems. This was also reflected 
in the debate on the EU’s Cohesion Policy. The Czech 
Republic received the highest per capita allocation 
in the 2007–13 financial perspective. However, there 
have been fraud and malfunction in the way those 
funds were spent, and politicians – mainly those from 
the ODS – have started to see European funds in less 
rosy colors.
Before drawing a conclusion that would single out 
major trends in the Czech approach toward EU 
integration, let us pay some attention to public opi-
nion. Data acquired from Eurobarometer surveys 
show that the EU had its best image in the Czech 
Republic in 2006, when 50 percent of  those sur-
veyed saw it in very positive or fairly positive terms. 
The decline in trust started in 2009, coinciding with 
the Czech EU Council presidency and the fall of  
the government in the middle of  it, the peak of  
the Czech Republic’s Lisbon Treaty ratification pro-
cess, and the outbreak of  the financial crisis. The 
EU had its lowest level of  support among Czech 
citizens in autumn 2012, when only 21 percent of  
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those surveyed considered the EU in very positive 
or fairly positive terms, whereas 35 percent held 
a fairly negative or very negative opinion of  it. 
Around 35 to 40 percent of  respondents remained 
neutral about the EU during the first ten years of  
Czech membership.
We can single out five features of  the first Czech 
decade in the EU.
Firstly, general Czech priorities in the EU have not 
changed. It has a liberal attitude toward the single 
market, energy policy, the eastern neighborhood, 
and the Western Balkans in EU external policy. 
Already formulated prior to the Czech EU Council 
presidency, these priorities have remained at the 
top of  the Czech Republic’s EU agenda.
Secondly, we could observe gradual de-politiciza-
tion of  the European agenda. Czech politicians 
neglected the importance of  European affairs, 
which was particularly visible during the EU Coun-
cil presidency and Lisbon Treaty ratification.
This has helped establish Václav Klaus as the 
agenda-setter in the Czech debate on the EU. As 
president from 2003 to 2013, Klaus played a very 
important role in setting the milestones of  Czech 
membership, especially the Lisbon Treaty ratifica-
tion. Any attempt to shift significant competences 
to the European level was met by strong resistance 
in the Czech Republic either from President Klaus 
or from Euroskeptics in the Civic Democratic 
Party. Because of  this, the Czech Republic is not 
party to several EU integration projects: the single 
currency, the Fiscal Compact, or banking union.
Moreover, the economic and especially the euro-
zone crisis coincided with a drop in support for the 
EU among Czech citizens. For some Czech politi-
cians, the EU is not perceived so much as a source 
of  welfare, which it was in the pre-accession period, 
but more as a problem-making entity.
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2. Perspectives
2.1 Czech Perspectives on the Visegrad 
Cooperation and on European Integration
This section describes Czech priorities in the EU. It 
will focus first on the Czech Republic’s approach 
toward the Visegrad Group (V4); second, on the 
Czech perspective on the EMU and EU institutio-
nal affairs; and third, on Czech energy and climate 
policy. Other priorities will be dealt with in the 
following part, and economic relations will make 
up the last chapter. This section intends not only 
to explain the fundamentals of  Czech European 
policy, but also to provide mid-term predictions 
about its development. Four general predictions 
are summed up in the conclusion. This section is 
based mainly on conceptual documents approved 
by the Czech government. Chief  among these are 
Czech Strategy in the European Union (2013),7 
Conceptual Basis of  Czech Foreign Policy (2011),8 
the National Energy Concept (which is about to be 
approved),9 and the Export Strategy of  the Czech 
Republic for 2012–2020.10 The second source of  
information for this section is information from 
opinion polls, the Czech Statistical Office, and the 
Czech National Bank. The third source is surveys 
of  the Czech policy elite.
The Prague-based Association for International 
Affairs (AMO) carried out two surveys of  the 
Czech policy elite on the subject of  Czech foreign 
and European policy. “Trends of  the Czech For-
eign Policy: Study of  Foreign-Policy Elites” was 
conducted in 2011 and centered on international 
issues.11 “Trends of  Czech European Policy” aimed 
at the European agenda were undertaken in 2013.12 
Both surveys addressed over 300 policy trendset-
ters: politicians, diplomats, civil servants, journalists, 
and people active in business, academia, and the 
nonprofit sector. The response rate was around 38 
percent.13
When the Czech Republic and other Central and 
Eastern European countries joined the EU in 
2004, there was much ambiguity about the fate of  
the Visegrad Group. Many claimed that there was 
no place for such a block in the EU, and that the 
V4 – would continue only as an entity centered on 
cultural cooperation. A Czech journalist focusing 
on central European issues, Luboš Palata, wrote 
in 2006 that the V4 was undergoing a post-party 
hangover. The main goal of  the cooperation had 
been the integration of  its members into the Euro-
Atlantic structures. This was achieved in 2004 
through full membership of  NATO and the EU. 
The V4 now had to find a new raison d’être.
The Czech position was quite pragmatic. It did not 
see any reason for dismantling or upgrading the V4 
cooperation. Moreover, as mentioned above, it did 
not have any strong European policy priorities by 
2007. Thus, the lack of  investment in the V4 coin-
cided with the search for European policy priorities.
Nevertheless, the preferences set in the Czech 
pre-presidency strategic document in 2007 have 
also become the priorities of  the Visegrad Group: 
energy security, the eastern dimension of  the Eas-
tern Neighborhood Policy (ENP), and the integra-
tion of  the Western Balkans into the EU. The years 
2007–2010 were decisive for the Czech perspective 
on the Visegrad cooperation. Firstly, the Visegrad 
Group members strongly supported the Czech EU 
Council presidency. Secondly, the gas crisis broke 
out, and the Eastern Partnership was launched. 
The latter two issues quickly made it onto the V4 
agenda, together with the Western Balkans.
The Czech Republic also acknowledged the advan-
tages of  having the V4 coordinate the European 
agenda. This development was linked to the post-
Lisbon process and the decisive role of  the Euro-
pean Council in managing the crisis. The need to 
strengthen the pre-summit consultations convinced 
Czech officials of  the benefits of  the Visegrad 
Group.14
Last but not least, the V4 has never been labeled as 
useless or fruitless by any Czech government since 
2004. On the contrary, the cooperation became 
part of  the European or foreign policy strategy 
documents, as well as part of  the prime minister’s 
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or foreign minister’s annual foreign policy state-
ments.15 Nor was its very existence questioned by 
the expert community, as it was after accession to 
the EU. The V4 is perceived as a tool for smart 
advocacy in the EU, especially in the areas of  ENP, 
the Western Balkans, and energy policy.
Nevertheless, one should not overestimate the ove-
rall role of  the V4 in Czech European policy. The 
recent opinion survey of  Czech European policy 
elites suggests that in ten years, EU Enlargement 
and ENP will not be as important as other policy 
areas. EU Enlargement and ENP were considered 
to be important or quite important issues by 53 
percent and 58 percent, respectively. In contrast, 
95 percent of  those who replied to the survey per-
ceived energy policy as a very important or fairly 
important issue. Furthermore, in an open-ended 
question, energy policy came second in importance 
to development in the eurozone. More than a third 
of  those surveyed mentioned it as one of  three 
issues of  the highest importance for the Czech 
Republic in the next decade. Thus, if  we study how 
important joint V4 priorities are at the national 
level, we may conclude that they are only of  partial 
significance.
On the other hand, other V4 members are among 
the country’s closest allies, according to the strate-
gic documents and the opinion survey of  Czech 
European policy elites. Let us first take a look at 
the conceptual documents. It has already been 
remarked that the Visegrad Group regularly forms 
part of  the prime minister’s and foreign minister’s 
addresses to the Czech diplomatic corps. The 
Visegrad cooperation was also part of  the Czech 
Republic’s foreign policy concept in 2003.16 In 
addition, all V4 countries deserved a particular 
paragraph, including Hungary, although it is not a 
bordering country. The last Foreign Policy Concept 
(2011) designated relations with Poland as strategic. 
Shared history is highlighted in the relations with 
Slovakia, whereas economic and political impor-
tance is emphasized in the case of  Hungary.17
The Czech European policy elites were asked in 
the survey to name three EU countries that they 
considered to be the closest allies of  the Czech 
Republic. Visegrad Group members did very well. 
In first position was Slovakia, mentioned by 72 per-
cent of  those surveyed. Third place was taken by 
Poland, selected by 61 percent of  those surveyed. 
(Poland ranked just behind Germany, which came 
in second, with 66 percent.) Only 7.5 percent of  
those who answered listed Hungary, which never-
theless ranked eighth. Interestingly, some important 
EU countries – France, Italy and Spain – were not 
mentioned at all.
Those surveyed were also asked to grade the qua-
lity of  relations with specific countries in European 
politics. (1 was the best grade, 5 the worst.) Rela-
tions with Poland and Slovakia were ranked the 
best. The average grade for relations with Slovakia 
was 1.6 and with Poland 2.05. Poland thus scored 
a little better than Germany, which got 2.14. Hun-
gary was not rated in this particular question. The 
vast majority of  those surveyed believe that rela-
tions with Poland and Slovakia will improve over 
the next ten years.
In the similar survey conducted in 2011, which 
focused on foreign policy elites, there were two 
questions devoted to the importance and future 
of  the Visegrad Group. Some 75 percent of  those 
who responded to the survey considered the V4 to 
be very or fairly important. Indeed, the V4 scored 
better than the World Trade Organization and the 
United Nations. On the other hand, survey respon-
dents were divided about the V4’s future. Approxi-
mately half  were of  the opinion that the V4 will be 
more important for the Czech Republic in the next 
ten years, while the other half  thought the opposite.
The V4 has established itself  as a cornerstone of  
Czech foreign policy. It is seen not only as a tool 
for achieving good neighbor relations and for cul-
tivating Central Europe but also as an advocacy 
group in European affairs. The preferences of  the 
Visegrad Group are also acknowledged long-term 
priorities of  Czech European policy. Moreover, the 
foreign and European policy elites believe that the 
Visegrad cooperation will remain an important part 
of  Czech foreign policy and that relations with 
neighboring countries, including Poland and Slova-
kia, will improve.
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2.2 The Czech Perspective on Economic 
Monetary Union and EU Institutional Affairs
As has already been noted, the global economic 
crises complicated Czech perception of  the Eco-
nomic Monetary Union (EMU). Important political 
actors have pleaded that the Czech Republic should 
acquire an opt-out from the adoption of  the sin-
gle currency. Other politicians, such as Petr Nečas 
from the ODS, have argued that the country can 
act like Sweden – i.e. avoid fulfilling the Maastricht 
criteria. The Czech Republic’s European Policy 
Strategy approved in May 2013 is astoundingly 
silent on the issue of  accession to the eurozone. It 
mirrors the state of  the center-right government, 
which was also divided on the issue. The document 
only acknowledges the fact that governance of  the 
eurozone has changed qualitatively since the out-
break of  the crisis. This is actually in line with the 
opinion held by Czech Euroskeptics. They think 
that these changes virtually invalidate the consent 
to adopt the euro given in the accession referen-
dum in 2003.
Support for adopting the euro is currently very 
low within the population. The last public opinion 
survey showed that only 18 percent were in favor 
of  Czech eurozone membership, whereas 77 per-
cent were against it. It is worth noting that the two 
groups were almost neck and neck until 2009 (with 
approximately 45 percent in favor and 45 percent 
against).18 It was only in 2010 that the numbers 
diverged starkly.
The government established in January 2014 is 
unclear about the year in which the Czech Republic 
should adopt the euro. The coalition agreement19 
states that the government will prepare the country 
for accession to the eurozone.20 It has also deci-
ded to consider joining the banking union and the 
Fiscal Compact, something the government has 
debated since it came to power. The government 
does not want to adhere voluntarily to any particu-
lar parts until it is a full member of  the eurozone. 
All in all, this suggests that the coalition parties are 
not enthusiastic about the euro. Though the Social 
Democrats and Christian Democrats see joining 
the eurozone as a mid-term or rather a long-term 
goal, they might have problems with fulfilling their 
pre-election promises and keeping the national 
deficit under 3 percent, as they are demanding a 
generous social system. The centrist populist move-
ment ANO, which is the junior coalition partner, is 
indifferent to Czech membership in the eurozone. 
Nor does it want to set the year of  euro adoption 
in the coalition agreement or even to state that 
membership is a governmental goal.
Although consensus for adopting the euro was 
already given in the 2003 referendum, ratification 
of  the Fiscal Compact and especially the Treaty 
establishing the European Stabilization Mechanism 
(ESM) is still required. The role of  the ANO politi-
cal movement is decisive in this process, since both 
treaties need a three-fifths majority in both cham-
bers of  parliament. If  ANO votes in favor, sup-
porters of  the treaties would have 137 votes in the 
two-hundred-seat Chamber of  Deputies – 17 votes 
above the quorum. On the other hand, if  ANO 
votes against, the supporters could only get ninety 
MPs on their side. The situation in the Senate 
would be even more blurred. At the moment, the 
ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Compact Treaty would 
have enough supporters. Because a third of  the 
Senate is elected every two years, however, the situ-
ation could change significantly. (Senate elections 
constitute typical second-order elections, and radi-
cal parties have some chance of  success.)
Czech European policy elites generally support 
their country adopting the euro. Three-fourths of  
those who responded to the survey are of  the opi-
nion that the Czech Republic should join the euro-
zone by 2020 and that remaining outside the euro-
zone harms the Czech economy. Apart from that, 
they believe that development within the eurozone 
will be the most important issue for the country’s 
European policy in the next decade.
The adoption of  the euro has so far been under-
stood as a political decision, and the euro perceived 
as a political project, as Václav Klaus has argued 
since the late 1990s. It was perceived as being 
rather disadvantageous economically, mainly due 
to the euro crisis and the need to participate in 
the European rescue mechanism. However, the 
experience of  Slovakia has slightly changed this 
image. Slovakia’s growth is higher than the Czech 
DGAPanalyse 9 | May 2014
14
Republic’s, and some experts and politicians 
(mainly Social Democrats) argue that the euro has 
made this eastern neighbor more attractive to for-
eign direct investments. This argument is definitely 
imprecise, however, yet it may become very popular 
with pro-euro politicians.
European policy elites in the Czech Republic also 
believe that the eurozone will stabilize, enlarge, and 
integrate its members economically, fiscally, and 
politically in the near future. Most, however, also 
hold that such development would not be favorable 
for the Czech Republic. The vast majority of  those 
surveyed think that the eurozone will systematically 
create its own institutions and legal frameworks, 
which will also cover more areas than just issues of  
the single currency.
The current Czech conceptual documents remain 
silent on the issues of  future institutional amend-
ments. The Czech response to the European 
Commission’s EMU roadmap (“Towards a genu-
ine Economic and Monetary Union”) was quite 
detailed in the three parts related to economic 
governance in the eurozone, e.g. it refused a spe-
cific budget for the eurozone. However, it omitted 
the fourth part of  the paper, which dealt with the 
democratic deficit and institutional affairs. Moreo-
ver, the Czech foreign minister had not participated 
in the workings of  the Westerwelle Group on the 
Future of  Europe that published the blueprint for 
institutional changes in the EU. Given how tough 
the ratification of  the Lisbon Treaty was – and 
the even more complicated ratification of  the tiny 
amendment of  Article 136 of  the Treaty on Func-
tioning of  the EU – there is clearly no political will 
in Prague for any institutional amendments. Even 
the country’s European policy elites agree on that 
issue. As far as they are concerned, significant ins-
titutional changes in the EU are not in the Czech 
Republic’s interest.
2.3 Energy and Climate Policy
Energy policy in the European and Central-Euro-
pean context has been important for the Czech 
Republic since its accession to the EU. The country 
first focused on issues of  the security of  energy 
supplies, later expanding this to the liberalization 
of  the European energy market. Climate change 
policy has never been a priority for the Czech 
Republic. Its stance on this has been rather defen-
sive, and has, together with other Central- and Eas-
tern-European member states, refused ambitious 
reduction of  CO2 emissions.
The Czech Republic is in the process of  drafting 
a National Energy Concept.21 So far, the second 
revised draft has been published and the public 
consultation procedure has been opened. The new 
center-left government is due to approve it. Of  
course, some amendments are still possible. The 
core of  the paper will probably remain untouched, 
however, as the key personnel in the ministry of  
industry and trade, which is responsible for the 
issue, will remain. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
chief  advisor to Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka 
is Vladimír Špidla, who is very sensitive about cli-
mate policy, may bring new clashes and possibly 
postpone adoption of  the concept.
The energy concept singles out three strategic 
goals: security, competitiveness, and sustainability. 
Security of  energy supplies is viewed in the broa-
der European context. Energy policy should be 
able to mitigate sudden external shocks. Moreover, 
energy prices for industry as well as households 
should remain comparable to the prices in other 
countries in the region. This should guarantee a 
competitive environment for Czech industry. Sus-
tainability is understood in a broader sense. Energy 
policy should be sustainable environmentally and 
economically as well as in the context of  human 
resources, social impact, and availability of  primary 
energy resources.
The conceptual document further elaborates these 
three strategic goals into five strategic priorities. 
The first priority is to aim to achieve a balanced 
energy mix, which would also be based on dome-
stic energy resources. The country should also keep 
domestic strategic energy reserves. Secondly, the 
Czech Republic should focus on energy savings. 
Thirdly, it should act internationally, integrating its 
energy and gas markets in the region and impro-
ving the energy infrastructure. The country should 
also contribute to the establishment of  an efficient 
EU energy policy. The fourth priority is to invest 
DGAPanalyse 9 | May 2014
15
in research, development, and human resources. 
The country’s fifth and final priority is to enhance 
its energy security and be able to deal with sudden 
energy cutoffs.
The concept does not introduce any radical depar-
tures from current energy policy. What kind of  
implications will it have on the Czech Republic’s 
European policy? The country will probably push 
through further liberalization of  the EU’s energy 
markets. It will also support construction of  new 
energy infrastructure, which would facilitate the 
functioning and security of  regional energy markets. 
It will also defend nuclear energy, which is expec-
ted to represent an important part of  the energy 
mix. The country prefers to remain reserved about 
any climate change policy goals. The predictions in 
the National Energy Concept show that coal power 
plants will remain important sources of  electric 
energy. Further attempts to reduce CO2 emissions 
would decrease the competitiveness of  the Czech 
economy due to the increase in energy prices.
It appears that Czech European policy elites see the 
situation differently. As mentioned in the section 
devoted to the Visegrad Group, they believe energy 
will constitute an import issue in the Czech Euro-
pean policy in the next decade. And according to 
80 percent of  those surveyed, the EU’s climate and 
environmental policies will be important for Czech 
European policy in the next decade.
The survey also included questions on perception 
of  common and conflicting interests in relations 
with selected member states in the EU context. 
There were some intriguing answers regarding 
energy policy in particular. Interestingly, energy 
policy has been identified as the Czech Republic’s 
only strong common interest with France. This 
is probably because the Czech European policy 
elites see France as a staunch supporter of  nuclear 
energy. They therefore believe that it is the main 
joint priority. On the other hand, Czech-French 
cooperation in that field has hitherto not been 
especially intense. The French company Areva has 
been recently disqualified from the tender for the 
construction of  two new blocks in the Temelín 
nuclear power plant.
Common interest in energy policy has been iden-
tified also in relations with Poland. The energy 
markets of  both countries are gradually integra-
ting, and both countries aim at diversifying energy 
sources and setting modest CO2 reduction goals. In 
relations with Germany, however, energy has been 
highlighted as the area of  greatest divergence. This 
must be understood in connection with Germany’s 
decision to undertake an “Energiewende” – a shift 
in energy policy. The shift has not been welcomed 
in the Czech Republic. The Czech government 
expressed its fear that Germany’s abandonment of  
nuclear power would increase electricity prices in 
the Czech Republic and that Germany would join 
the camp of  anti-nuclear member states.
2.4 Key National Preferences in the EU
The following section will discuss important 
Czech priorities not covered in the previous 
chapter. It will deal with benefits of  EU member-
ship and key European policy areas for the next 
decade.
The Czech Republic’s most recent European 
Policy Strategy identifies seven priority areas in 
the EU.22 Delimiting particular priorities is not 
easy, however. The strategy states that these prio-
rities are (1) support for the development of  the 
internal market; (2) efficient use of  EU Cohesion 
Policy and its link to the Europe 2020 Strategy; 
(3) prospects of  single currency adoption in the 
Czech Republic; (4) further sectoral priorities; (5) 
the EU as an area of  freedom, security, and jus-
tice, (6) EU enlargement and Eastern Neighbour-
hood policy; (7) common foreign and security 
policy; and (8) common trade policy. The scopes 
of  these priority areas are very different, and 
they are virtually incomparable. Use of  Cohesion 
Policy and the euro adoption are more national 
priorities, so they will be omitted in the following 
discussion.
Deepening the single market has been among the 
top Czech European priorities since the very begin-
ning of  the country’s EU membership. According 
to the European Policy Strategy, removing the 
remaining barriers to the single market – rather 
than coordinating national economic policies – is 
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the most appropriate tool for restarting growth. 
The strategy also states that the single market does 
not function well in the service sector and that 
further liberalization is needed there.
The country’s center-right governments have been 
very critical of  new regulation coming out of  
Brussels, though at the same time they have urged 
further development of  the internal market. They 
have favored “negative” over “positive” integration 
and stressed the need for subsidiarity and proporti-
onality. Although the center-left government might 
have a slightly different attitude toward Brussels, 
the liberal approach will not change significantly, 
since the Czech economy profits from an open 
European market.
European policy elites share this opinion. They 
believe that the single market will become stronger 
and that it will be one of  the important issues for 
Czech European policy in the next decade. A slight 
majority of  those surveyed think that social legis-
lation will not be harmonized. They also believe 
that a free European market for services should 
deepen, though they are not confident that a fully 
liberalized market will emerge in this sector in the 
next ten years. Elites remain evenly divided on the 
issue of  whether the financial transaction tax (FTT) 
should be introduced in the Czech Republic. The 
surveyed elites are, however, mostly unanimous in 
holding that the single market is the most signifi-
cant benefit of  Czech EU membership.
The government program formulated in Febru-
ary 2014 mentions the removal of  the internal 
market’s barriers as one of  its main priorities.23 It 
also singles out the need to sustain European social 
standards. The Czech Republic will probably pay 
attention to a possible “race to the bottom” in 
social policy when it comes to negotiating future 
free trade agreements, which the program also lists 
among priorities.
Czech European Strategy mentions transport and 
energy policy in a section on “other sectoral poli-
cies.” Although it is not very precise, it emphasizes 
an “economically sustainable approach to the envi-
ronment,” with which the February 2014 govern-
ment program concurs. It points out that the coun-
try should play an active role in setting EU climate 
policy goals but that it must pay special attention to 
the competitiveness of  its economy.
The section of  the document devoted to the “area 
of  freedom, security and justice” is hardly more 
specific. It only states that flows of  immigrants 
from outside the EU should not harm free move-
ment within the EU. It is worth noting that com-
mon asylum and migration policy was not at the 
top of  the Czech European policy elites’ list of  
important issues for the Czech Republic in the next 
decade.
Neither EU enlargement nor its neighborhood 
policy were highlighted by Czech European policy 
elites as important topics for Czech EU policy in 
the next ten years. Paradoxically, these issues have 
resonated in official documents as policy priorities 
since 2007. The Eastern Partnership in particular 
remains a priority issue.
The same elites did not consider a common EU 
foreign and security policy or common security 
and defense policy to be among the most impor-
tant issues. The European Policy Strategy does not 
go into much detail in this regard, although the 
Foreign Policy Concept from 2011 does. Apart 
from the abovementioned Eastern Partnership and 
the Western Balkans, it emphasizes stability in the 
Middle East, well-functioning transatlantic relations, 
good cooperation between the EU and NATO, 
and human rights policy.
Stress placed on the external trade policy by Czech 
policymakers in published government programs 
and strategy overviews should be understood as 
a push for further liberalization of  international 
trade and easier access to overseas markets. The 
country’s European policy elites believe that this 
issue will be rather important in the next decade. 
Moreover, they are optimistic that the EU will sign 
free trade agreements with the US, China, Ukraine, 
India, Brazil, and Canada by 2020. The overwhel-
ming majority (95 percent) also believes that such 
developments would be beneficial to the country.
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2.5 The Czech Republic’s Economic 
Partnerships
As has already been emphasized, the Czech Repu-
blic has an open and export-oriented economy. 
This condition will be dealt with in more detail 
below. The section will introduce the country’s 
major trading partners and indicate some of  the 
political implications.
The Czech Republic trades mainly with neighbo-
ring countries.24 Germany, Poland, Austria, and 
Slovakia make up 51.2 percent of  total Czech 
exports and 41.6 percent of  Czech imports. Ger-
many, Poland, and Slovakia have been its main 
external trade partners since 2004, the most 
important of  which has been Germany. The 
turnover of  Czech trade with Germany constitu-
ted 28.5 percent of  total trade in 2012, whereas 
turnover with Slovakia made up only 7.6 percent, 
and Poland made up just 6.6 percent. Two coun-
tries outside the EU hold fourth and fifth posi-
tions: China, with a turnover of  5.8 percent, and 
Russia, with a turnover of  4.7 percent. Imports 
comprise the major part of  trade with these 
countries. The EU made up over 80 percent 
of  exports in 2012 and 64 percent of  imports. 
Machinery and transport equipment dominate 
Czech exports (54.1 percent) as well as imports 
(41.3 percent).
Foreign direct investments (FDIs) come to the 
Czech Republic predominantly from the EU. EU 
member states were involved in 90 percent of  
FDIs in the Czech Republic in 2012. Main inves-
tors came from the Netherlands, Germany, and 
Austria. Eurozone members made up 83.7 per-
cent of  FDIs in the country.25
The Czech Republic is well integrated into the 
European internal market. The inflow of  FDIs 
comes predominantly from the eurozone, and the 
eurozone and neighboring countries are the main 
target for Czech exports. As has already been 
noted, the Czech government would like to diver-
sify international trade and increase the share of  
non-EU markets. Nevertheless, Czech European 
policy elites do not believe that the structure 
of  foreign trade will change dramatically in the 
next decade. They do not think that the share of  
the Czech exports to the EU will drop below 70 
percent.
The structure of  Czech foreign trade and FDIs 
will plausibly determine Czech European policy. 
It will defend the single market and push for dis-
mantling of  any remaining barriers. It will also try 
to enhance Czech industry’s comparative advan-
tage on the single market. It will try to avoid any 
increa se in energy prices and invest in science, 
research and infrastructure. The country’s Euro-
pean policy elites identified these fields as the 
most appropriate targets for EU resources in the 
Czech Republic in the next cohesion policy pro-
gramming period.
Conclusions
The following conclusions may be drawn about 
the Czech Republic’s European and Central 
European policy:
Firstly, the Czech Republic is well integrated, 
both politically and economically, in the Central 
European region. Neighboring countries are per-
ceived as the most important partners in the EU, 
consume the majority of  Czech exports, and the 
Visegrad cooperation has established itself  as the 
uncontested tool for regional cooperation. This 
will not change in the coming ten years. Further-
more, the Czech Republic should improve its 
infrastructural connections with its neighboring 
countries, and the possible adoption of  the euro 
would decrease any remaining heterogeneities in 
the region.
Secondly, the single market will remain the 
important priority of  Czech EU membership. 
The open and export-oriented Czech economy 
benefits from the European single market. The 
competitiveness of  its industry is of  the utmost 
importance. The Czech Republic will therefore 
endeavor to keep energy prices down. This 
should be achieved through liberalization of  the 
European gas and electricity market and further 
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integration of  the regional energy market. Any 
climate change goals that would mean an increase 
of  energy costs would not be welcomed.
Thirdly, accession to the eurozone would require 
a high degree of  political investment. Public sup-
port for this step is very low, and several political 
parties are opposed to it. Although Czech Euro-
pean policy elites support the adoption of  the 
single currency and believe the eurozone’s deve-
lopment will determine the quality of  Czech EU 
membership in the next decade, their voices may 
not count. On the other hand, given the structure 
of  Czech trade and FDIs, there is no doubt that 
the country will remain closely connected with 
the eurozone’s economy.
Fourthly, there will not be any political will for 
fundamental EU institutional reform. The Czech 
Republic does not see any need for further law 
amendments. Its stance toward such development 
will most likely be either rather passive or some-
what defensive, depending on the nature of  the 
cabinet. A multi-speed EU does not seem to pose 
a huge problem for the Czech Republic, unless 
the single market is threatened.
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